Contract theory is effective in designing incentive compatible mechanisms in a monopoly market under incomplete information, where the employer needs to sign a contract with employees before fully knowing their private information. The key idea is to offer the right contract items so that all agents have the incentive to truthfully reveal their private information. In our problem, we can imagine the network as a labor market. The PU is the employer and offers a contract to the SUs. The contact consists of a set of contract items, which are combinations of spectrum access time (i.e., reward) and relay power (i.e., contribution). The SUs are employees, and each SU selects the best contract item according to its type. We want to design an optimal contract that maximizes the PU’s utility (average data rate) under the incomplete information of SUs’ types. We further show that the PU’s average utility loss due to the suboptimal DC algorithm and the strongly incomplete information are relatively small (less than 2 and 1.3 percent, respectively, in our numerical results with two SU types).
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